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Protagoras, Gorgias and the Dialogic Principle
J. K. NEWMAN
When Protagoras published the 'AXrjdeLa rj KarafiaXXovTeq [A6701],
his title looked like a gesture of the most blatant cynicism.' This was
not the only evidence to support such an accusation. He was also the
author of the 'Avri-XoyiaL, and the theme of the two books of this
treatise, we are told, was that, on any given question, arguments of
equally compelling logic could be advanced both for and against. In
that case, "truth" as something objective— a concept familiar even
to such a non-philosopher as Pindar^—appears to be completely
destroyed. It is in this sense that a passage in Euripides' Bacchae
(200-03) is often interpreted, where we learn that long established
things are not overthrown by any logos:
' Indispensable older treatments of the Sophists remain: M. Untersteiner, The
Sophists, tr. K. Freeman (Oxford 1954); W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy
III (Cambridge 1969). More recent work includes: F. Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments
of the Greek Enlightenment (Princeton, New Jersey 1975); C. J. Classen ed., Sophistik,
Wege der Forschung 187 (Darmstadt 1976, with full bibliography); G. B. Kerferd, The
Sophistic Movement (Cambridge 1981); idem ed., The Sophists and Their Legacy, Hermes
Einzelschriften 44 (Wiesbaden 1981): cf. especially Professor Kerferd's introduction
(pp. 1-6), "The Future Direction of Sophistic Studies." The great merit of Professor
Solmsen's book is to handsel the topic of the history of ideas in the fifth century.
Obviously a Geistesgeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts (in English ! ) is sorely needed. This
study will heal the quarrel to which Plato refers {Rep. X. 607b), for in it the poets
and particularly Pindar, so often dismissed as no thinker, will play an essential role.
^ 'AXadaa was first made a goddess by Pindar, according to M. Nilsson, Geschichte
der griechischen Religion I (2nd ed., Munich 1955), p. 748: cf. U. Holscher, "Pindar
und die Wahrheit," in Wandlungen: Studien zur antiken und neueren Kunst (Munich
1975), pp. 90 ff.
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ovSeu ao<f>i^ni(T0a rdiai baifioatv.
iraTpiovc, irapaSoxcxq, Sec, d' onffXtKaq Xp'ov(^
KiKTtfutd', ovd(t(; avTct Kara^aXXet. Xoyoq,
au5' tt 5i' aKpoiv ro ao<f)bv rfvprjTai (ppevQiv?
The artistic point— again familiar from Pindar— is that Truth is
unveiled by Time,"* and that if something is long established it must
therefore have enhanced— even unchallengeable— claims to be true.
Comforting though this doctrine might be to poets who professed to
eternize, and to their patrons, it was evidently denied by the apparently
new and outrageous implication that everything remained always an
open question (dtaaol Xoyoi).
Although the charge of "ethical relativism" and of a general assault
on received values is so often brought both against Protagoras and
the Sophists as a whole, it is of course too simple to believe that the
thinkers and teachers who descended on the heart of the Greek world
from its periphery in the later years of the fifth century were nothing
but iconoclasts. Both Protagoras and Gorgias had quite respectable
philosophical credentials. Sicily, the forcing-ground for new ideas,
had inherited the problems of the well established Italian Eleatic
school of philosophical skepticism about claims to know. Zeno of Elea
was credited by Aristotle (fr. 65 Rose) with being the founder of
dialectic. In Protagoras' native city of Abdera, Democritus too was
an Eleatic. It was in this tradition and in reaction to Parmenides that
Gorgias had begun as a philosopher before he turned to the study
of rhetoric, and thereby forfeited, according to E. R. Dodds, his
claims to be a "Sophist" at all.^
' Murray's text seems superior on the whole to that printed, for example, by
Jeanne Roux, Euripide, Les Bacchantes (Paris 1970), although I have accepted her
Kara^aXXti in line 202, already weighed by Dodds ad loc. In considering the style of
Euripides, Aristotle's remarks {Rhet. III. 1404b24-25) can hardly be over-emphasized.
In line 200 ao<i>i^otiai is constructed with a following dative, by a bold extension, as
if it were naxonai: cf. the motif of deonaxioi in the play (vv. 45, 325, 1255). The
asyndeton at 201 marks the speaker's emotion as he utters his solemn declaration of
faith. There is nothing inadmissible in colloquial style about the resumptive avra at
201. It is not merely Kara^aXXa which encourages one to think about Protagoras
here, but that verb allied with (ro<f>i^onai before it and <to<})6v following.
^ Cf. 01. 10. 53-55. The long history of this motif is discussed by F. Saxl, "Veritas
filia temporis," Essays Presented to E. Cassirer (Oxford 1936), pp. 197-222; E. Panofsky,
Studies in Iconology (repr. New York 1972), pp. 73 ff.
^ Plato, Gorgias, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1959), pp. 6-7. Contrast Kerferd, The
Sophistic Movement, p. 45 and note.
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Aristotle was unsympathetic to history, as the ninth chapter of the
Poetics shows. Is it perhaps the reading of Aristotle which convinces
the modern student of ancient philosophy that "style" in his discipline
has nothing to do with content? Obviously, no one could derive this
opinion from reading Plato ! And, even in the case of his disciple
Aristotle, everyone understands at least notionally that what we have
from him is only part of the record, lacking the aureum flumen
orationis. How much one would give, for example, to read the HtpX
I\.olt\tO:v ! But, if Albin Lesky is right in suggesting that Thucydides
deliberately echoes Protagoras*' in introducing the first pair of con-
trasting orations in his History, that between the Corinthian and
Corcyrean ambassadors at Athens, what has to be admitted is that a
"Sophist" and alleged skeptic about the truth handed to the greatest
of ancient historians, one who claimed that his work would be an
everlasting treasure precisely because it offered access to the truth
(I. 20-22), a basic tool of historical analysis, the speech and counter-
speech. Is not this already a philosophical achievement of the highest
order, and one that makes a refreshing contrast with the Poetics} And
the form of these speeches is moreover in debt to Gorgias ?
Obviously twin speeches occurring in real life called for the
judgment of an audience. Set now in the record, thesis and antithesis
have to be synthesized by the reader for himself. But this evidently
lends another interpretation to Protagoras' doctrine of (xKi]dua. It
was not after all blatant cynicism, but an emphasis on the dialogic
principle which his work proclaimed, however much it may have
been misinterpreted by Euripides (as Euripides was misinterpreted
himself, for example by Aristophanes^).
The dialogic principle states that all dogmatic and would-be final
formulations are betrayals, and hence the importance to it of the
term airopia already found in Pindar {Nem. 7. 105: cf. Eur., Bacchae
800), and another proof of the modernity of the world in which he
moved. There is only, for the seeker after truth, the ay6)v, which
may take various forms, and eventually becomes the presentation of
a particular point of view by a speaker aware of its partiality, and the
courteous wait for an opponent to develop his reply (but not, of
course, his refutation). In Thucydides, by what the Formalists would
call a denudation du procede, this technique (which explains why his
speakers echo one another's phrases) is eventually manifested in the
^
'Ai'TtXcryiac, 31.4: cf. Lesky, History of Greek Literature, Eng. tr. (London 1966),
p. 476.
' See especially Solmsen, pp. 83 ff.
« Hippolytus 612: cf.Thesm. 275, Arist., Rhet. IH. 1416a29-35.
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so-called "Melian Dialogue," otherwise such an anomaly in the struc-
ture of the History.^
This pre-Platonic, historical use of dialogue form by Thucydides
shows certain typical features. The "courteous wait" to which allusion
has just been made is evident at V. 86: ri ntv eTruUeLa tov bibaaKtiv
Kad' rj(rvx'i-c(v aXXrjXovq; the concern with truth at 89: ra dwara 5' e^
wu tKOLTdpoL aXTjdibq (f)povovn€u bLaTvpaaatadat; the seriousness of the
topic at 101: ayiiiv . . . irepl . . . aoiTijpiaq. Clearly we are confronted
with a "threshold" situation, quite literally a matter of life and death,
which deploys forjudgment an argument about a religious and ethical
question: do the gods protect the just but weak cause, or is might
right? The resemblance of the Athenian case to positions attributed
to Thrasymachus in the first book of Plato's Republic is clear.
It is part of the genre (as old in fact as the Book of Job) that no
satisfactory answer is stated. The Athenians behave exactly as they
intended all along. The Melians are defeated, the men murdered,
the women and children enslaved. If the story of the Sicilian Expe-
dition which begins the next book is the proof that the gods do after
all avenge the right, that is small consolation for the Melians, and in
any case a conclusion that we must draw for ourselves. All we can
observe here and now is the character of the participants.
Sophistic elements have been noted in the Hippocratean corpus.'"
The dialogic form used here by Thucydides quite independently of
Plato is also illustrated in the novel of Hippocrates, the first epistolary
novel of European literature," the first with an ideologue as its hero
(Democritus, the "laughing philosopher"'^), and interestingly, an
exploration of madness. The dialogic form could be used then as
heuristic and empirical, a tool to grasp at rather than fix an elusive
truth. Democritus symbolizes the absence of "seriousness" in this
quest, which does not make it frivolous, since seriousness may be
^ Yet subtly integrated by W. Robert Connor, Thucydides (Princeton, New Jersey
1984), pp. 147-57. Thucydides shows such familiarity with the idioms of the dialogic
style that a careful examination of his History for more hidden ("estranged") features
of it would clearly be rewarding.
'" Cf. Kerferd, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
" For an indication of its contents, see Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker
(repr. Berlin 1974), II, pp. 225-26. It should obviously be taken much more seriously
as a literary and philosophical phenomenon than the commentary implies. Its alleged
lateness, for which linguistic evidence is a very uncertain guide, is no proof of its
unimportance, and it is glossed by Maloney and Frohn (see below, note 13) with the
rest of the corpus.
'2 Cicero, De Oral. II. §235, is especially relevant. Cf. Diels-Kranz II, p. 28, no.
81.
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inapposite to the last things. Perhaps all one can do at the end is
laugh.
Democritus, with Leucippus the author of the atomic theory, was
like Protagoras a native of Abdera, and like Gorgias an Eleatic.
Abdera was normally thought of as the city of fools, and yet his
laughter evidently was compatible with the most committed interest
in philosophical truth. Whatever the date of the Hippocratic Novel,
it has symptomatic value. It shows that ultimately it was plausible to
credit the Abderite Democritus with having inspired in the medical
science of his day both a method and a literary form— but for
exploring foolishness, madness.
It is tempting to suppose that the Abderite Protagoras did the
same thing for history, for the madness which was the Peloponnesian
War. Thucydides was certainly interested in abnormal states of mind.
Cleon symbolized the negation of the Periclean ideal of wise states-
manship, and his "mad promise" to capture the Spartans on Sphacteria
is described by a Hippocratic word (IV. 39, /xavLOi^driq).^^ Naturally, in
spite of the epic thrust of his narrative, and of the many battles he
describes, the rationalist Thucydides avoids the fiaivoum which is so
common for "blood lust" in Homer's apLarelai. But at this juncture
in his narrative, when rationality appears to have failed, he tellingly
uses on a unique occasion about Pericles' ape Cleon (he echoes
Periclean language, as has been often noted: cf. II. 63. 2 and III.
40. 4, avdpayadi^eadai) a piece of medical terminology, of which
there are five examples in Hippocrates.
The historian's interest in avveatq may also be seen in this context.
Themistocles is praised for his possession of it (I. 138. 2), but it is a
quality which cannot save Phrynichus (VIII. 27. 5). It plays a great
role in Diodotus' answer to Cleon (III. 42). Iivveroc, occurs four times
in Hippocrates, and avveaiq fourteen. 'Aavueroq is both a Heraclitean
(1 and 34, Diels-Kranz) and a Hippocratic word.
This complex of ideas also explains to a.4>pov at V. 105. 3, an
accusation brought by the Athenians against the Melians, and a token
of topsy-turvy values in a context showing Sophistic influence.''' There
are ten examples of a<t)pu}u in Hippocrates.
"Avoia, of which there are two examples in Hippocrates, is another
important concept. Democritus had already condemned it as a civic
'^ The examination of Hippocratic vocabulary here has been greatly facilitated
by the five volumes of the Concordance des Oeuvres Hippocratiques by Gilles Maloney
and Winnie Frohn (Montreal 1984).
''' Kerferd notes (p. 1 12) the anticipation of Plato's Gorgias 483e3 at Thucydides
V. 105. 2.
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vice, and praised its opposite.'^ At II. 61 (iroWri avoia iroXenriaaL)
Pericles uses the word in this Democritean way to suggest that, though
normally war is folly, it is the only course now open to the Athenians.
Later, Diodotus in the speech already mentioned uses it to dissuade
the Athenians from following Cleon's advice about the Mytilenians
(III. 42 and 48. 2). Both these arguments are reasonable enough.
But in V. 111. 3 the Athenians warn the Melians against the avoia
of rejecting their proposals, and in Book VI, Alcibiades both uses
avoia about himself (16. 3; 17. 1) with a kind of boastful bravado,
and later at Sparta describes the Athenian democracy as onoXoyovfxevrj
oipoia (VI. 89. 6). Cleon has won, in spite of Diodotus. In Alcibiades'
parody of the Funeral Oration of Pericles, the world of moral discourse
has been turned upside down. We can see both the terrible decline
from the earlier part of the story, and the paradoxical proof of the
rightness of this description of the modern democracy in Alcibiades'
own career.
The debt to Abdera and Protagoras suggested by this internal
dialogue culminates in Book VIII, where the complete absence of
speeches has long been noted. But this silence is a profoundly
significant gesture. As madness deepens, the dialogic principle is
totally denied. How little this is understood by those who insist on
dividing form from philosophy, and philosophy from historical anal-
ysis, and all three from the Sophists.
Thucydides' family owed its wealth to Thracian goldmines, and
his acquaintance with Abdera may easily have been gained firsthand.
His interest in medical terminology is well attested. But it looks as if
he found in Ionian medicine not just terminology but a method of
diagnosis. In fact, the Abderite and Protagorean dialogic form evinces
a primitive principle of thought deeply embedded in the most
elementary Greek way of approaching the world, as the national
fondness for /lev and de clauses shows. At the level of action, it shows
itself in the preoccupation with what J. Burckhardt calls "das Agonale,"
but in the Greek case, never the solitary wrestle of Jacob with the
angel in the wilderness, but the witnessed rivalry of champions for a
prize. The Games channelled these rivalries into a stylized alternative
to (not preparation for
!
) war, and of course competitors wanted to
win. Yet it is not the winning which the vase-painters, for example,
typically show us, but the contest.
The Games also provided a rich source of imagery for literature.
Even here there was mutual interaction between Xoyoc, and epyov.
Pindar, as concerned as Thucydides and Plato after him with character,
'^ Fr. 282, Diels-Kranz II, p. 204.
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explains the role of the poet in holding up a mirror to the deed, in
seeing, in providing witness."^ It is not surprising then that they
became also the venue for pamphleteers and publicists, for a war of
words. And should not as much attention be given to those words as
athletes gave to their bodies? Gorgias, who had noted that his
countrymen found poetry immensely persuasive, sought to lend the
same poetic persuasiveness to prose, and with this, prose too entered
the realm of the ayi^v. But this agonistic prose itself bore the marks
of its intent. Even its insistence on antithesis, parisosis and homoeo-
teleuton may now be seen, not as decoration for its own sake, but as
yet further underscoring of the dialogic principle."
One of the great strengths of the Greek genius is that its flowers
never lost contact with its roots. A recent study for the non-specialist
remarks of the history of Greek philosophy in general:
Two lessons can be drawn from this example [Epicurean physics],
which are crucial to the interpretation of Greek philosophy. First, its
dialectical character: Greek philosophy is primarily a dialogue or
argumentative encounter, not only between contemporaries, but also
and perhaps more interestingly, with thinkers of the immediately
preceding generation. The questions which a philosopher tries \o
answer are typically raised by his dissatisfaction with theories that are
currently on offer. Aristotle's philosophy is in large measure a critical
response to some of Plato's most ambitious theories. In order to assess
the interest of Aristotle's ethics or metaphysics, we need to consider
both his arguments and the dialectical context in which they are
placed. Aristotle himself makes this very plain, but it is a point that
applies no less strongly to other Greek philosophers whose work is
less well preserved. As summarized in ancient or modern handbooks
the cut and thrust of philosophical argument, responding to real or
imaginary opponents, too easily turns into a catalogue of doc-
trines. . . .'®
'«
"EffOTrTpw, Nem. 7. 14. This is also St. Paul's word: NT 1 Cor. 13:12. This
religious concept demands a separate monograph. MapTvc, too is a religious idea, also
found in the seventh Nemean (49). We already noted airopia in this densely textured
ode (105). It was the reaction of Herod to his conversations with John the Baptist:
riirbpa, NT Mark 6:20. But they were nevertheless enjoyable {vSiwc,, loc. cit.). In the
concept of the "Zuschauer" Greek vases (see K. Schefold, Goiter- und Heldensagen der
Griechen in der spatarchaischen Kunst [Munich 1978], p. 272) and Pindar come together:
cf. Pyth. 9. 26 fF. and, in general, J. K. Newman, The Classical Epic Tradition (Madison
1986), pp. 233-34.
" And his insistence on composing encomia of the most trivial or challenging
objects shows that he had not forgotten (any more than Erasmus did later) the
element of make-believe and fun which that genre implies.
'* A. A. Long in The Greek World, ed. Robert Browning (London 1985), pp.
102-03.
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The dialogic principle persisted into the most sophisticated phil-
osophical explanations of cosmology. Parmenides' motionless universe
of Being and Not-Being was differentiated and paradoxically recon-
ciled by Heraclitus' "Love" and "Strife," and by Empedocles'
pt^oonara ("roots" or elements). "Dialectical materialism," itself a
reaction to Hegel, has made our century familiar with these notions
in a way far from theoretical. But they have in fact certain implications
for philosophical form, since the primitive consciousness could not
by definition handle abstracts. This is already shown for Western
Greek thinkers like Parmenides and Empedocles by their choice of
medium: not the prose of Ionia, although even there Eduard Norden
noted in Heraclitus certain strivings towards artistic polish, but the
hexameter of Homer and Hesiod. Empedocles indeed, although the
intent of his work puzzled Aristotle, merits from him the highest
praise as an artist, and passed as the "founder of rhetoric" (Diog.
Laert. VIII. 57). At the same time, Empedocles was a mystagogue
and wizard ("shaman") of a primitive and extraordinary kind, pro-
voking hostility as well as admiration, as the opposite reactions to
him of Lucretius and Horace still attest.'^
Some of these formal implications may be listed here:
1. Time is not apprehended in the dialogic complex as a sequential
series, but as a dimension of space ("vertical time"). There is only
710W, and everything, past and future, is available in the present.
This primitive concept, when driven to extremes, explains Par-
menides' insistence on the impossibility of change.
2. Yet primitive man is all too aware of change. He solves his problem
by his practical observation of nature. The child is father of the
man, the acorn is already under the woodman's gaze an oak. At
an elementary level, this means that metamorphosis is a valid and
even dominant conceptual mode.^° Everything carries with it the
map of its own past and future, and this map may be scanned now
by the discerning eye of the wise.^'
These modes persist into more abstract formulations. Empe-
docles answered Parmenides by his doctrine of four roots moved
by Love and Strife. Aristotle followed this ultimately biological
model, when he argued that the bvvafiic, is present to the entelechy
to govern its development.
'^ De Rer. Nat. I. 729-33; Ars Poetica 463-67.
^^ Cf. J. Burckhardt, Griechische Kulturgeschichte (4th ed., Berlin-Stuttgart 1902),
pp. 5-18, "Die Metamorphosen." The Pythagorean metempsychosis and Empedocles'
various avatars (fr. 1 17, Diels-Kranz) attest the same concept.
2' Cf. Empedocles, fr. 129, Diels-Kranz 1, p. 364.
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3. Primitive societies like to assist the not so discerning eye however
by the wearing of masks. ^^ The mask de-individualizes the partic-
ular, and emphasizes, though not of course intellectually, the
universal. The mask, and the mime or ritual action in which masks
or disguises of some sort are deployed, are important tools of
primitive thought, and evidently for the Greeks led on to comedy
and then to developed drama of the kind we know in Athens. But
Athens was not the only center of some kind of performances,
and we are told that, sophisticated thinker though he was, Plato
was a devotee of the mimes of the Sicilian poet Sophron to such
an extent that he slept with them under his pillow. The mime,
like all dramatic performances, finds the truth between its characters.
It also finds the truth laughable, and this idea too, the ancestor
of both Democritus' Eleatic skepticism (and Abderite foolery) and
the Socratic irony, is important for Plato.
4. A certain kind of suspended time is privileged, because this
mentality has no interest in the time of the (as yet non-existent)
mechanical clock (Bergson). These are the times which signal
change, momentarily caught as it were in the act; festivals of
various kinds connected with the harvest, with the enhancement
of the tribe that comes from eating, drinking, sex: in more refined
parlance, the symposium; the funeral ("wake"), and its annual
commemoration at the grave; the wedding and the acceptance of
new members into the clan.
5. We saw under (3) already in the case of the mime that a certain
kind of reaction to the perception of change is privileged, and
that is laughter. This happens even in the face of what to the
refined sensibility looks like "tragedy," since tragedy, at least in its
purest form, is the transitory invention of quite advanced urban
societies like fifth-century Athens and seventeenth-century France
(and even in fifth-century Athens the tragic trilogy was normally
followed by a "satyr" play to redress the balance). Laughter, which
may be stylized in that special type of ritual known as the game,
must be understood as anything but dismissive. What is laughed
at is meant to be preserved and saved. This is easily seen from
Aristophanes' gibes at the society of his native Athens, or the
Roman satirist's gibes at Roman life and manners. In this sense,
the inconclusive ending of the game of words ("dialogue") is part
^^ The rich material assembled by Katerina J. Kakouri, UpdCaropia tov Qtarpov
(Athens 1974), deserves the closest study.
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of its very essence. '"^^ Only the man with no sense of time wins, or
rather thinks he has won.
6. Certain kinds of space are privileged, in particular, the public
square or circle, often situated before the door or threshold,
because that is the space through which access is available to the
numinous. This is why games and feasts have often been held at
tombs, or in churchyards, and why the theatre has such close
connections with religion, even in its physical form. Later, as
religious awareness fades, the numinous degenerates into merely
the unknown. But perhaps even the unknown may best be ap-
proached through the game, and in this context the student of
literature must remember Huizinga's remark that every verse
form is a form of play.
7. Truth (in so far as it is legitimate to introduce such an abstract
into this discourse) is polysemous, and is grasped musically (Py-
thagoras) or polyphonically. "Sophist" meets us for the first time
in Greek with the meaning "musician," "lyric poet" (Pindar, Isth.
5. 28), in an ode which also emphasizes the value of Xb'^oc,.
Herodotus calls Pythagoras a sophist (IV. 95), and in view of later
developments it is interesting that we are told elsewhere (Cicero,
Tusc. Disp. V. 8-10) that Pythagoras abandoned the claim to be
wise, and instituted instead the claim merely to "love wisdom,"
i.e. to approximate, but asymptotically, to the desired goal. It is
not the correspondence of some statement with "reality" which
determines whether an utterance is true or not, since ideality is too
fluid a concept to be immobilized in this way. Heisenberg's Un-
certainty Principle, itself a rediscovery ofa Heraclitean and Platonic
position, ^^ would in any case rob any reality so immobilized of its
objectivity. Rather, the coherence theory decides what is true. This
is another way of saying that Time decides. Does the allegedly
true statement fit the experience of the tribe, fit the contours of
a four-dimensional nou^ This primitive adherence to the established
truth explains the reaction of the astronomers who refused to look
through Galileo's telescope. Of course they were obscurantists.
But perhaps they were also conscious of how much that was
important would have to be surrendered in order to gain the
trivial knowledge that Jupiter had moons. How often did even the
greatest of the Greeks fail to look through that telescope ! If the
^^ Beautifully caught by Tacitus, Dialogus 44, cum adrisissent, discessimus.
^'* Cf. Werner Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conception' of Nature (London 1958), p.
60.
J. K. Newman 53
truth is what "cannot lie hidden" (a-leth-eia),^^ it is not we but
the nature of the historical process itself that best produces reliable
knowledge ("science"). Such an attitude is by no means hostile to
experiment, but it mistrusts the experiments devised in any lab-
oratory except that of the witnessed, public a'yicv.'^^
Although Plato so often signalled his hostility to the concept of a
mobile and shifting truth, paradoxically it is now possible to under-
stand certain formal features of his work, including both his use of
verbal repetition, already, as we noted, evident in Thucydides (it is
another form of vertical time), and the "dramatic" element (which
is simply another version of the dialogic). The Republic is said in fact
to have been contained almost in its entirety in Protagoras' Antilogka.^'^
In that case, how interesting that the first book, for example, contains
a number of details commonly regarded at best as picturesque, and
at worst as utterly irrelevant to the serious business in hand—
"philosophy," interpreted however by an understandable but inex-
cusable modern dogmatism as if it were sophia.^^ It may now be seen
that these details are essential clues to the intended meaning.
The first of them is the occasion, the feast of the Thracian ( !
)
goddess Bendis, held at the port of Piraeus, as it were the "gateway"
to Athens. The celebrations will resume in the evening with an
equestrian aniWa symbolizing the game of life,^^ but they are
suspended for the moment, while Socrates and his friends seek respite




. . dans certaines conceptions philosophiques aXfjdaa est oppose a Afidrj 'oubli'
. .
." (P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue grecque III (Paris 1968), p.
618).
-''' See Reflexivity: The Post-Modern Predicament (London 1985) by Hilary Lawson
and his important article in The Listener, vol. 115, no. 2948 (20 February 1986), pp.
12-13, "The Fallacy of Scientific Objectivity," with reference to the work of Simon
Schaffer. The conference chaired by Mr. Lawson at the Institute of Contemporary
Arts, London, in March 1986 was entitled "Dismantling Truth: Objectivity and
Science." The resemblance to Protagoras' 'AXrjdaa ^ YLara^oiKKovTic, is striking. But
of course the aim of the conference at least was to establish new insights into scientific
method. Heisenberg's treatise (above, note 24) continues to be relevant.
-" Diog. Laert. III. 37 and 57. Cf. Kerferd, p. 139.
^^ Julia Annas, for example, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford 1981), sees
only a picture of "complacency" (pp. 16 fF.). But this is to misunderstand the genuinely
religious nature of Cephalus' remarks about a-yaBri tkiri^ (on which F. Cumont, Lux
Perpetua [Paris 1949], has a whole appendix, pp. 401 ff.) and his quotation from
Pindar at 331a. He echoes in fact themes of 01. 2. 53 IF. If Polemarchus had been
judicially murdered when Plato was writing, had not also Socrates? This theme serves
to emphasize the "threshold" nature of the mise-en-scene , its fragility and at the same
time its privileged access to the truth rather than its complacency.
'^^ Quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt, Lucr. II. 79.
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Cephalus is a metic (one who has "changed his home"), he lives at a
harbor, with its constant comings and goings, and he talks about his
imminent death, describing himself as "on the threshold of old age."
He is only in conversation with Socrates from the threshold of another
activity, since he must be off to perform certain religious duties. He
evokes in his remarks a well-attested complex of traditional religious
ideas.
Plato has then already hedged his dialogue about with certain
quite clearly indicated limitations, tokens of its "transitory" nature.
Into this dialogue eventually intrudes the figure of Thrasymachus,
who betrays his ineptitude by his failure to understand dialogic
conventions. He abuses Socrates as a child, instead of recognizing
the privileged status which the child enjoys in the primitive community
(the "divine child"; Heraclitus had understood this concept when he
represented Time as a playing child, Diels-Kranz I, p. 162. 5). He
insists on delivering a long monologue, which is meant to establish
an incontrovertible, and therefore unavailable, truth. Of course, he
must in his turn be shown up as a clown, and that is why Plato
permits himself to poke a certain fun at his red face and sweaty
embarrassment (350d).
The most important use of dialogic symbolism however is reserved
for the end (354). We are carefully reminded that it is still the
Bendidia. Plato makes Socrates compare the previous conversation to
a meal at which he has snatched up this dish and that, without
however being able to say that he has satisfied his appetite. But this
unsatisfactoriness, this self-uncrowning by the hero, for which he has
been so often scolded, is the essence both of Socrates' "irony" and
of the open, dialogic manner. We cannot expect any final resolutions
in the nature of things. It is precisely the imagery of the meal which
is used by the philosophers to encourage us to face death (Lucretius,
Horace, Seneca).^'' But death is the most unsatisfactory of all our
arguments, because we can never win it, and yet eating is our only
approximation to victory. This is why Priam and Achilles learn an
accommodation with death over a meal, and why the Iliad ends with
a funeral feast. The presence of the dead at the annual celebration
of their deaths with the rinfresco is another part of the same skein of
ideas.
In the case of the ending of the first book of the Republic the
*" Lucretius III. 938 (cf. E. J. Kenney in his edition of this book [Cambridge
1971], pp. 212 ff.); Horace, Satires I. 1. 118-19 (where see Kiessling-Heinze's note),
Epp. 11. 2. 214; Seneca, Epp. 61. 4: in general, B. P. Wallach, Lucretius and the Diatribe
against the Fear of Death, Mnem. Supp. 40 (1976), pp. 64-65. Horace's rideat is telling:
Epp. 11. 2. 216.
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argument (conducted of course by the now dead Socrates) is not so
much at a banquet as identified with it. Like all these dinner debates,
it remains unsettled. In another sense, we may think of Thrasymachus
and Socrates as two contestants in a duel (and of course sometimes
that element was bodied forth in other circumstances and societies
in an actual combat before the assembled guests, even at the doors
of the tomb). But none of these occasions can ever end finally. In
spite of the duel between Thrasymachus and Socrates, a vital question
is "left on the table." How are we to live our lives? Only the post-
mortem "journey of a thousand years" can answer: and how revealing
it is for Plato's cast of thought that, when the good man has won
out at the end of that endurance test, he goes around collecting his
prizes like a victor in the Games. ^'
It is the business of the intervening books of the Republic to make
this dimension actual, so that we can now, as we pick up the text,
hold the answer quite literally in our hands.
There is then nothing discreditable about the first book of the
Republic, if we will attend to its form rather than merely to its
arguments. The ultimate challenge is not logical at all, but ethical,
which (to recall an earlier part of our argument) is another way of
saying that not the correspondence but the coherence theory of truth
determines the result ("time will tell": it is the demand shortly to be
put at the beginning of Book II). This is why the character of Socrates
is so important to Plato. No one acquires his character overnight,
yet precisely such a telescoped embodiment ("incarnation") of the
truth is required by this style. It would have been invidious for Plato
to advance himself as some sort of ideal fusion of wisdom and life in
his own work. But he can advance such a fusion in the person of a
revered master, and this is the symbolism of the inheritance of the
argument from old Cephalus by those whom he leaves to carry on
the discussion, and of Socrates' role in articulating their doubts and
puzzles. At the same time, by concealing himself behind the mask of
that master, Plato is able to shrug off any responsibility for the
ultimate truth of what is dialogically said. This "shrugging off" (most
visible at the start of the Phaedo (59b), a "threshold" dialogue par
excellence) is a kind of laughter (irony), laughter at the seriousness of
the claim to the absolute.
It is now possible to understand why Aristophanes' comedy the
Ecclesiazusae shows such extraordinary resemblances to certain argu-
ments of the Republic. Usually, Aristophanes and Socrates are taken
as opposites, and the one is sometimes thought to have contributed
^' X. 62 Id: cf. J. Adam's note on V. 465d.
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to the end of the other. That can only have been because the Athenian
state had lost its sense of proportion, and of what an Aristophanic
comedy means. Part of the purpose of Plato's Symposium, at which
both Socrates and Aristophanes are guests, is to remind forgetful
Athenians of their dialogic good manners, and, because this reminder
is already too late for the feast, that contributes immensely to the
dialogue's tragedy-in-comedy, emphasized by Plato at the end. But
Utopia is a regular comic theme (borrowed also by the Sophists), the
double of our present society held up like a mirror to magnify and
mock our shortcomings. When Plato held up the same mirror as
Aristophanes, he had the same comic or satirical intent. Which of
them spoke first in this dialogue matters much less than realizing
that Plato too is deploying a comic ("ironic") apparatus.
Aristophanes shows that an essential and primitive part of comedy
is the assault on other literary men ("false prophets"), which is why
literary satire is such an enduring genre. It is part of the Republic
too. But we have to understand that, in Plato, the mixture of prose
and verse is not just the technique of the scholarly article, quoting a
source in order to comment. The motley look of the last pages of
Book II and early pages of Book III of the Republic is already a
heuristic device, a way of giving utterance to two voices that anticipates
the Menippean satire, or Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae . Homer
or Aeschylus is not after all silenced in this court. As in the case of
Thucydides' pairs of speeches, the argument must be settled by the
jury, and the jury is the individual reader.
In Book X of the Republic Homer comes under attack because he
both imitates what is bad, and because imitation is bad anyway. Here
(596d), the image of the mirror used by Pindar proudly about his
own komic art, and boldly adapted by Alcidamas to defend the Odyssey
(Aristotle, Rhet. III. 1406b 12), is interpreted in malam partem. But
the paradox by which a master imitator condemns imitation must
not escape notice. It too is part of the denial of ultimate truth, or
better, of human access to ultimate truth in words. ^^ Can Gorgias'
youthful declaration of the incommunicability of knowledge be so
far away?
Plato was not stopped by this inaccessibility any more than Gorgias
from exploring what transrational language could do to break out
of the philosophical impasse. He argues in the Republic that what we
think of as reality is really a shadow world, a flickering copy of the
hidden truth. In another striking image, he recalls Glaucus from the
sea, encrusted with weed and shells, to picture for us the soul
32 Cf. Letter VII, 341c; Phaedrus 275e ff.
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overgrown with this life's desires and pleasures, and utterly trans-
formed from its real nature. This poetry condemns our perceptions
of normality as corruptions or metamorphoses of a second and
superior world, precisely therefore a distorting mirror of the true
thing. It is only because the poet's mirror of this mirror is bigger
and more insistent than our lazy, routine looking that at long last we
begin to notice something is wrong.
This is the essence of the comedian's art. It is appropriate in an
essay so much influenced by M. Bakhtin to draw an example from
Russian literature. Both in Dead Souls and The Inspector General, N.
V. Gogol does exactly the same thing as Plato, and the motto of the
latter masterpiece is the Russian proverb "Don't blame the mirror if
your face is crooked." Gogol was the literary ancestor of Dostoevsky.
But, if he helps us to understand in what sense Plato's mimic and
comic art absorbs and outdoes the schematic dialectic of Protagoras,
he also secures recognition for Gorgias, and recovers for Gorgias his
claim to be a Sophist. The Russian writer was famous for his recitals
of his own works, and for that attention to word-play and euphony
which we associate with the Gorgianic tradition, in this case mediated
to Russian literature through Byzantium. But the profound desire of
the author oi Selected Passages from Correspondence with Frieyids (1847)
to influence through his art the morals of his countrymen cannot be
disputed.
We spoke earlier of Gorgias' philosophical beginnings. His early
work in this mode advanced three propositions: that nothing exists;
that, even if something did exist it could not be known; that, even
if it could be known, this knowledge could not be communicated to
others. ^^ On the normal calculus, Gorgias' subsequent turning to
rhetoric looks like an abandonment of these positions, or even worse,
another motive for cynical exploitation of ethical relativism. If knowl-
edge is impossible, why should not the prize go to the best guesser?
Why not, if guesswork is all we mortals can manage?
Plato rebelled against this, even though Isocrates defended it as,
in politics at least, nothing but common sense. Interestingly, Isocrates
was, after Thucydides, Gorgias' most impressive disciple, and his
influence in practical politics is attested by Cicero {De Or II. 94).
Once again, we have the same paradox as with Protagoras. His
' kvTLkoyiaL possibly inspired the Novel of Hippocrates, but they
certainly, or so at least it appears, handed Thucydides an extremely
sharp tool of historical analysis. And Gorgias' apparently empty
'' Sextus Emp., Adv. Math. 7. 65-87.
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preoccupation with mechanical figures,^'' what the Formalists call
"sound gesture," and abandonment of the claim to absolute knowledge
gave rise, through Isocrates, to a school of practical politicians and
men of action. How could such barrenness bear such progeny?
The answer is that, if truth is unknowable and incommunicable,
human society is not left entirely resourceless, and least of all Greek
society. Truth indeed is lost to abstract methods of recovery, yet it
is interesting that the statement that truth is unknowable only seems
matter for despair to an audience which has lost, or is beginning to
lose, its roots. To the religious and primitive man it is a commonplace,
accounting for the importance in his mentality of mystery, and for
the essential obscurity or masked nature of myth. It is only in late
antiquity that handbooks of mythology appear. The truth that is
unknowable may nevertheless be approached through indirection, by
what theologians call "apophatic" definition, and "apophasis" may
explain the paradoxical nature of Gorgias' own philosophical state-
ments, as well as the poetic nature of his stylized prose. There was
a way to approach the unknowable, and that was through the irrational
spell exerted by poetic discourse. This is why Gorgias developed his
theory of artistic prose after all as a philosophical gesture.
In primitive societies, truth may be approached through myth,
and that myth may be remembered in some sort of ritual discourse,
eventually in poetry. This is not a second best. What is second best
is the bloodless abstraction. Primitive realities are too important to
be disembodied in this way.
We can already see here a reason for Parmenides to write in verse.
Although he dismisses Not-Being as inappropriate to or ineligible for
rational discourse, verse enables such discourse to hint even at the
transrational, and therefore to establish a dialogue with what otherwise
would be unsayable:
TOJi travT' ouon{a) hrai,
oaaa ^poTol KaredevTO KeiroiObnc, uvai a\r)6r),
yiyvtadai rt kuI oXXvadai, eivai t« koi ovxU
Koi TOirop aXKaaaav 8ia t€ XPO« (l)avbv aniifiav.
^'* However it should be noted that the Gorgias of the phrase ax7]naTa TopyUta
was probably the teacher of Cicero's son in Athens {Ad Fam. XVI. 21. 6), who wrote
a book on the (Txvt^oi'ra, partially preserved in Latin translation. See especially
Quintilian IX. 2. 102; the article by Munscher in RE VII. 2, cols. 1604-19; and
Schanz-Hosius, Romische Literaturgeschichte II, pp. 741-43. The expression is not
definitely attested before his time. In this sense the opening pages (15-16) of
E. Norden's Antike Kunstprosa need refinement, since the activity of the younger man,
who was nothing but a rhetorician, has obscured the understanding of the Sophist,
who was far more.
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But does not this magnificent passage (Diels-Kranz I, p. 238, fr. 8,
vv. 38-41) already say something about nothing? And is that legitimate
simply because we have to understand that verse has special rights?
And must we not understand this also of Plato's prose poems?
Empedocles answered Parmenides in verse because a prose answer
to the verse of the master would have been unsatisfactory, empty.
The intended level of dialogue is too primitive and too profound for
prose, especially in the mouth of a mystic. His two poems "On
Nature" and the "Purifications" may be thought of as antithetical
presentations of two sides to the description of the world. In one
sense, it is possible to set out the truth in a form accessible (but not
too accessible, as we see from Aristotle's remarks about Empedocles
in the Poetics) to everyone. In another, such a truth is useless to the
impure and unprepared.
Yet Parmenides was said by Speusippus to have established laws
for his fellow citizens^^ and, on top of his shamanism, Empedocles
was also a politician, an enemy of the Emmenid tyranny at Acragas.
He cannot have supposed then that his wisdom was of a purely
abstract kind, in spite of its formal, hieratic, beauty, which might in
fact have secured him an attentive audience, had he been unconcerned
with practical consequences, from a monarch like Theron, for whom
Pindar wrote the second and third Olympians. Earlier, the disciples of
Pythagoras, the mathematician and musician, were credited with the
political takeover of certain communities. It seems therefore that
Athenian public opinion was right. When the Sophists, particularly
Gorgias, with his Western Greek tradition, but also Protagoras, who
was to draw up a constitution for Pericles' colony at Thurii, arrived
in Athens, they did have the intention of doing more than deliver a
course of lectures and leaving. They were the heirs of the Pythago-
reans, of the Eleatics, of Empedocles, and they meant to impinge on
political ideas, and this is why the young and ambitious flocked to
them: but impinge on these ideas through what should not so much
be called rhetorical as dialectical training, which would have to be
content with guesswork, crToxao'Ti/cT;, do^aaTLKt], uKaaiar'^ Pindar
praises the trainers to whom his young victors owed their successes,
and here were new trainers for new aydvec,. Their immediate con-
version of no less a historian than Thucydides not just to a style but
to a theory of truth proves the impression they made.
Attic vases give evidence of the social world in which young
'• Diels-Kranz I, p. 218, 18-19: cf. p. 220, 20-23.
" Cf. Thuc. I. 138 (and Cicero, Ad Att. X. 8. 7); Isocr. Or. XIII. 17; Plato, Gorgias
463a.
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aristocrats, the destined targets of this Kulturkampf, felt at home: the
komos, the drinking party, athletics, horsemanship, eros. The Symposium
of Xenophon unites some of these themes, and it is interesting that
the company is entertained there both by the 7eXcoro7roi6(; Philip, and
by a troupe of dancers, who present an erotic mime. Yet the
dinnertable conversation is concerned with ethics, and nothing in-
congruous is perceived about this combination.^' Xenophon was
concerned to present a portrait of the dialogic Socrates in action, in
exactly the kind of milieu which the Sophists frequented.
Precisely the same is true of Plato in his Symposium. Certain comic
features of the two dialogues are in fact shared. Like Philip, Socrates
arrives late. So does Alcibiades. At the end, so does a group of
KicixaaTai. There are threshold ("at the door") situations, mixed
emotions. Both dialogues resort to myth.
Plato also indulges in literary satire, significantly at Gorgias'
expense. ^^ In the philosophical effort to grasp the nature of Eros,
eloquence naturally takes wing. What is there here with which
Empedocles could have quarrelled? But we can perhaps see the whole
nature of Plato's war with the Sophists as an effort to beat them at
their own game, and that is why they must so often be represented
as bad characters bad at dialogue, unfairly, because dialogue was
their mission. The common man, as Aristophanes' Clouds shows,
viewed Socrates himself as a Sophist. His effort to differentiate himself
was in the first place, at least as Plato presents it, an effort to prove
that they had not understood their own epistemology. .
A truer account of the Sophists would, in giving them credit for
their public and political interests, also praise them for their attention
to the word, the faculty which, according to Isocrates, distinguishes
man from the animals. ^^ But the Sophists were not just interested in
their own word. In the verbal ay6)v no one side can claim to be
wholly in the right. An ideal dialogue evidently depends on the
acknowledgment of this moderation. Aristophanes' nerve failed even
before the Peace of Nicias, and this is why the Clouds ends with such
an ugly parody of dialogue, for which the poet invents a special
verb.^° After the defeat in the Peloponnesian War, the sophistic
" Ridentetn dicere verum / Quid vetat? Hon Sat. I. 1. 24-25.
** Cf. R. G. Bury's introduction in his edition (Cambridge 1932^), pp. xxxv-vi on
Agathon's speech. See also the pun at 185c.
^^ Antidosis (Or. XV) §§293-94. The theme echoes in Dante, De Vulgari Eloquentia
I. 2, and was then modified by Petrarch.
'"' AiaXt7rToXo7oO/im, 1496. This is Strepsiades' brutal perversion of the dialogic
principle. Whether Protagoras' books were burned at Athens or not, book burnings
were known both to the Greek (NT Act. Apost. 19:19) and Roman worlds (Tac.
Ann. XIV. 50), but this attack on learning is more sinister, since it is done in full
knowledge and contradiction of the civilized alternative. This is what seems to have
shocked Plato so much.
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hesitation and lack of commitment to the truths of the city seemed
to the Athenians in general to have been harmful and untimely. It
is telling that the common man took his revenge by executing for
this clouding of the obvious— Socrates. Without the partial advocacy
of Plato, would we be so sure that the common man, by his own
lights, was wrong? This was already a position defended by Kierke-
gaard.
The paradox is that Plato, who felt the unfairness of this death so
personally, sought to dispel that same hesitation by using some of the
Sophists' weapons. Like Thucydides, he borrowed from Protagoras'
and Gorgias' armory, for only that supposition explains the resem-
blance between his art and that of the Melian Dialogue. He was just
as interested as Gorgias in the transrational scope of language in the
face of the incommunicable, just as interested as Protagoras in the
possibilities of myth. Just as much as Pindar or the Christian evangelist,
he knew that airopia is a positive and religious concept. '*'
But, whatever the intended irresolutions of some of his own
dialogues, he had little mercy on the new masters of philosophical
discourse, of the game of words among the young and influential,
for they stood in the way of a "proper" presentation of Socrates,
and ultimately by their lack of commitment threatened a second
defeat when the city was under attack from outside. In this regard,
his dialogue with Aristophanes has led to major misunderstandings
of the dialogic principle, since his satire of the Sophists has been
interpreted as what it could never be, final truth. At this distance,
we must be chary of blaming him for the aura of infallibility his view
has acquired. Perhaps he could never have imagined that he would
be read in a society where dialogue and its conventions were atten-
uated or forgotten, drowned by the univocal blare of the radio
loudspeaker, the mechanized and deadly laughter of the sitcom.
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'" See note 16, above.

